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Towards a Knowledge-Based Account
of Understanding
Christoph Kelp∗
Abstract
This paper aims to provide support for a knowledge-based ac-
count of understanding. More specifically, I will outline an ac-
count of understanding according to which, roughly, (i) ideal
understanding of phenomenon P is maximal knowledge of P
and (ii) degrees of understanding of P are distances from max-
imal knowledge of P. In addition (iii), (i) and (ii) are combined
with a contextualist semantics for outright attributions of un-
derstanding. I will argue that there is positive reason to favour
this account over the internalist competitors offered by Kvanvig
and Elgin as only this account can do proper justice to data con-
cerning comparative degrees of understanding. Finally, it will
be shown that this account does not fall prey to a number of at-
tacks on knowledge-based accounts of understanding in recent
literature, due to Elgin, Kvanvig and Zagzebski.
1 Introduction
Understanding is among the highest cognitive achievements we, hu-
mans, can attain. It is hardly surprising, then, that recent epistemol-
ogy has witnessed a surge of interest in the nature of understanding.
However, this line of epistemological inquiry meets with complica-
tions from the very start. The reason for this is that understanding is
such a complex matter. For starters, understanding is not only one of
the highest but also one of the most complex cognitive achievements
we may hope to attain. Moreover one can understand a variety of dif-
ferent things, including that something is the case, why it is the case
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and how to do something. One can also understand various phenom-
ena in the world, including persons, events, theories and so on. In or-
der to make this complexity more tractable, I would first like to intro-
duce a distinction, familiar from the literature on the subject, between
two broad types of understanding in accordance with two broad cat-
egories of objects of understanding: propositional understanding—such
as understanding that p and understanding why p—on the one hand
and objectual understanding—i.e. understanding of various phenom-
ena (persons, theories and events)—on the other.1 I would also like
to point out that, in this paper at least, I will focus exclusively on
objectual understanding (henceforth simply ‘understanding’).
Two questions have been at the forefront of the epistemological
debate over the nature of understanding. The first is whether under-
standing is, in some sense to be specified, factive.2 Among defenders
of the factivity of understanding, there is a further controversy over
whether understanding can be analysed in terms of knowledge.3 The
aim of this paper is to argue that there is reason to think that both
of these questions can be answered in the affirmative. In order to
achieve this, I will outline my own preferred knowledge based ac-
count of understanding (henceforth also ‘KU’ for short), which I de-
veloped in a recent paper (Author 2015) (§2), and produce some ev-
idence favouring KU over its most prominent non-knowledge based
competitors (§3). I will then show that KU avoids a number of objec-
tions that have been raised against knowledge based accounts (hence-
forth also ‘K accounts’) in recent literature (§4).
2 The Account
In what follows, I will sketch the main theses of KU. A more detailed
discussion can be found in (Author 2015).
The first thesis of KU is about maximal understanding:
1 Notice that objectual understanding may itself have propositional objects. Cru-
cially, however, these objects will be what Kvanvig (2003, 192) calls “bodies of in-
formation” rather than individual propositions.
2 Champions of the factivity of understanding include John Greco (see e.g. 2010),
Stephen Grimm (see e.g. 2006; 2010), Jonathan Kvanvig (see e.g. 2003; 2009), Peter
Lipton (see e.g. 2004; 2009) and Duncan Pritchard (see e.g. 2008 and his contribution
to Pritchard et al. 2010). Foes of factivity include Catherine Elgin (see e.g. 1996;
2006; 2009), Wayne Riggs (see e.g. 2009) and Linda Zagzebski (see e.g. 2001).
3 Grimm, Greco and Lipton defend knowledge-based accounts of understand-
ing, while Kvanvig and Pritchard maintain that a state weaker than knowledge is
sufficient for understanding.
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Maximal Understanding (Max-U)
If one has fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected
knowledge of a phenomenon P, then one has maximal under-
standing of P.
A key source of support for Max-U is the intuition that someone who
knows everything there is to know about a certain phenomenon, who
has fully comprehensive knowledge of it, also understands it as well
as it can be understood. For instance, if A knows everything there is
to know about the Monty Hall Problem, he understands the Monty
Hall Problem as well as it can be understood. And an omniscient God
not only knows everything there is to know about all phenomena, but
also understands all phenomena as well as they can be understood.
On reflection, it turns out that fully comprehensive knowledge of
a phenomenon won’t be quite enough for maximal understanding
of it. After all, one might have fully comprehensive knowledge of
a phenomenon that is entirely unconnected. Perhaps each item of
knowledge has been acquired via testimony from a different source
and one has not connected the individual pieces of information in
one’s head. Such unconnected knowledge does not seem to make
for much understanding, and certainly falls short of maximal under-
standing. The well-connectedness proviso at issue in Max-U deals
with this kind of difficulty. The idea is that an agent’s fully compre-
hensive knowledge about some phenomenon, P, is maximally well-
connected when the basing relations that obtain between the agent’s
beliefs about P reflect the agent’s knowledge about the explanatory
and support relations that obtain between the body of true proposi-
tions that describe P.
The second thesis of KU concerns (non-maximal) degrees of un-
derstanding:
Degrees of Understanding (Deg-U)
Degree of understanding of P is a function of distance from
fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge
of P: the closer one approximates fully comprehensive and
maximally well-connected knowledge of P, the higher one’s de-
gree of understanding of P.
I must confess that I have done very little to offer a detailed account
of degrees of understanding in the earlier paper. What’s more, I will
not make much progress on this front here either. However, I’d like
to say at least the following.
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First, I do not mean to suggest that degree of understanding is
a function only of the number of propositions known. On the con-
trary, the prospects for a purely quantitative account are dim. To see
this, notice that understanding may be assessed along different di-
mensions including breadth and depth.4 As a result, while maximal
understanding will be both maximally broad and maximally deep,
less than maximal understanding may approximate maximal under-
standing via different routes, as it were.
Second, quantitative differences can ground differences in degrees
of understanding. Roughly, the idea is that if we hold all other fac-
tors that affect degree of understanding fixed, differences in quantity
of knowledge translate into differences in quality of understanding.
Here is a slightly more precise proposal.
Where ‘β(_ , . . . )’ denotes _’s set of beliefs about . . . , ‘κ(_ , . . . )’
the set of _’s knowledge of . . . that affects _’s degree of understand-
ing of . . . , and ‘γ(_ , . . . )’ the set of grounding relations that hold
between the members of _’s knowledge about . . . :
Better Understanding (Bet-U)
For any phenomenon P and agents A1 and A2, if β(A2, P) ⊆
β(A1, P), κ(A2, P) ⊂ κ(A1, P) and γ(A2, P) ⊆ γ(A1, P), then
A1’s understanding of P is better than A2’s.
While this is still a far cry from a fully-fledged account of degrees of
understanding, for present purposes, it is all that I will need.
The remaining thesis of KU concerns outright understanding. Or,
to be more precise, it concerns attributions of outright understanding,
i.e. attributions of sentences of the form “A understands P”:
Outright Understanding (Out-U)
“A understands P” is true in context c if and only if A ap-
proximates fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected
knowledge of P closely enough to be such that A would (be
sufficiently likely to) successfully perform any task concerning
P determined by c, if, in addition, A were to have the skills
needed to do so and to exercise them in suitably favourable
conditions.
4 As I already mentioned in the earlier paper, one may be tempted by the idea
that approximations to fully comprehensive knowledge measure breadth of under-
standing and approximations to maximally well-connected knowledge measure
depth of understanding.
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The basic idea here is that in order to count as having outright un-
derstanding, one must come close enough to maximal understand-
ing. How close is close enough? The answer is that that depends on
context. Context sets a threshold for what it takes to count as ap-
proximating maximal knowledge closely enough to count as having
outright understanding. Evidence for a contextualist semantics for at-
tributions of outright understanding stems from the fact that our will-
ingness to attribute understanding to one and the same agent varies
with context. For instance, we may be happy to attribute outright un-
derstanding of a phenomenon—the evolution of humankind, say—to
an eight-year-old in a context of a primary school teachers’ discus-
sion of pupil performance in a recent exam. At the same time, we
would deny the eight-year-old understanding in a context in which
members of a search committee discuss whom to hire for a recently
advertised professorship in biology.
KU analyses understanding in terms of knowledge. It is therefore
a K account. That said, it may be worth noting that the aim of the ear-
lier paper was to show that KU is preferable to the most prominent
accounts of understanding in the philosophy of science literature, to
wit, explanationist accounts, which analyse understanding in terms
of knowledge of explanations, and manipulationist account, which
analyse understanding in terms of abilities to manipulate represen-
tations.5 While I stated KU in terms of knowledge, for the purposes
of the earlier paper this was inessential. As far as that paper is con-
cerned, the account might just as well have been stated in terms of
justified or true belief. However, I believe that there are good rea-
sons to opt for a knowledge based account of understanding. The
remainder of this paper will be devoted to developing some of these
reasons.
3 Evidence
According to the main competitors to K accounts in the literature,
the epistemic state in terms of which understanding is analysed is a
non-factive state and, as such, weaker than knowledge. Defenders
of these accounts appear to share the assumption that the relevant
5 For defences of explanationism see e.g. (Hempel 1965; Salmon 1984; Khalifa
2012, 2013). Manipulationist accounts have been defended in e.g. (de Regt & Dieks
2005; de Regt 2009a,b; Grimm 2006, 2014; Wilkenfeld 2013).
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epistemic condition on understanding is internalist in nature.6 They
disagree about what precisely the internalist condition amounts to—
a requirement of transparency (Zagzebski) or a coherence condition
(Elgin, Kvanvig)—and about what else is needed for understanding
apart from the internalist condition—truth (Kvanvig) or some other
kind of grounding (Elgin). This section aims to provide some evi-
dence that favours KU over what I take to be its most promising non-
knowledge based rivals in the literature, i.e. the specific accounts of
Kvanvig and Elgin.
3.1 Kvanvig
Let me begin with a brief characterisation of Kvanvig’s account. He
states the core features of his account of understanding in the follow-
ing passage:
What is distinctive about understanding, once we have satisfied
the truth requirement, is internal to cognition. It is the inter-
nal seeing or appreciating of explanatory and other coherence-
inducing relationships in a body of information that is crucial
for understanding.
(Kvanvig 2003, 198)
Understanding a phenomenon, according to Kvanvig, involves (i)
having beliefs (perhaps also a theory) about it that (ii) are (by and
6 Pritchard’s non-knowledge based account of understanding may be an excep-
tion here. True, Pritchard overtly embraces internalism about understanding when
he writes: “[U]nderstanding seems to be essentially an epistemically internalist
notion, in the sense that if one has understanding then it should not be opaque
to one that one has this understanding—in particular, one should have good re-
flectively accessible grounds in support of the relevant beliefs that undergird that
understanding.”
XXXXXXXX
(?, 82). That said, on perhaps the most prominent way of construing the in-
ternalism/externalism divide, Pritchard’s view would appear to come out as ex-
ternalist. On this view, internalism about a given epistemic property (e.g. jus-
tification/understanding) claims that whether or not an agent has that property
supervenes on factors internal to the agent alone. But now notice that, according to
Pritchard, understanding is a cognitive achievement, which means that it requires
cognitive success as well as the exercise (reliable) cognitive ability. Whether or
not an agent has understanding does not supervene on factors internal to him/her
alone. So, Pritchard’s account is not internalist. Since externalism is defined simply
as the denial of internalism, Pritchard’s account comes out on the externalist side
of the divide. While I discuss Pritchard’s account in more detail elsewhere (Author
2014a), I won’t be concerned with it here. The main reason for this is that he offers
an account of propositional rather than objectual understanding.
6
large) true and between the contents of which (iii) coherence-inducing
relationships obtain. Moreover, (iv) one must see or appreciate—and
this presumably involves belief—that these relations obtain.7
How does Kvanvig account for the existence of different degrees
of understanding? While he does not go into much detail on this
issue, Kvanvig does point out that someone’s beliefs about a subject
matter may differ in “degree of coherence” as well as “in terms of
the amount of information contained regarding the subject matter”
(2003, 196), in other words, in terms of informativeness. Presumably,
then, the thought is that degree of understanding is a function of
coherence and informativeness of one’s beliefs.8
With these considerations in play, I will now argue that Kvanvig’s
account gives the wrong predictions of comparative degrees of under-
standing in the following cases:
Case 1. A1, a famous biologist, has conducted careful research into a cer-
tain biological phenomenon, PB, thus arriving at a set of beliefs β(A1, PB)
of beliefs about PB. Let us suppose that all members of β(A1, PB)
qualify as knowledge and that, in fact, A1 has attained fully compre-
hensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of PB.
Case 2. A2, another biologist and contemporary of A1’s, has conducted
careful research into PB. A2 has gathered and come to believe a data
set about PB. Moreover, A2 has also devised and come to believe a
theory T2 of PB. In this way, A2 arrives at a set β(A2, PB) of beliefs
about PB, including the belief that T2 is plausible in light of δ2, that T2
explains δ2 and that β(A2, PB) is highly coherent. Suppose that A2’s
beliefs are a proper subset of A1’s beliefs, i.e. β(A2, PB) ⊂ β(A1, PB),
that all members of β(A2, PB) qualify as knowledge and that A2’s
knowledge of PB is as well-connected as they can be.
7 Notice that it is a core feature of Kvanvig’s account that there is no external
condition on understanding besides the truth condition. This is the crucial differ-
ence between understanding and knowledge, which does require satisfaction of
some such condition (in order to deal with the likes of Gettier cases).
8 In fact, there is reason to believe that the relevant function will have to be more
complex. First, Kvanvig allows that understanding tolerates peripheral false beliefs
(2003, 201). Second, in order to account for depth and breadth of understanding,
Kvanvig will arguably have to distinguish between amount of information and
significance of information contained. As a result, there is reason to think that
degree of understanding will have to be a function of coherence, informativeness,
significance and truth ratio. Since my argument trades on quantitative difference
translating into qualitative differences in understanding, these complications are of
little consequences for the purposes of this paper. For that reason, in what follows,
I will work with the above (simpler) account.
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Case 3. A3 is the founder of a sect for which PB is of central importance.
On the basis of superstition, wishful thinking and A3’s views about
what sort of theory would best further his interests as sect leader, A3
has confabulated and also come to believe theory T3 of PB. Along the
way, A3 also confabulates and comes to believe a set of data, δ3 about
PB. (Suppose that A3 would have believed this of any theory-data
combination he might have made up.) In this way, A3 arrives at a set
β(A3, PB) of beliefs about PB, including the belief that T3 is plausible
in light of δ3, that T3 explains δ3 and that β(A3, PB) is highly coherent,
as well as a set γ(A3, PB) of grounding relations between these beliefs.
Incredible as it may be, A3 arrives at exactly the same beliefs about
PB as A2, i.e. β(A3, PB) = β(A2, PB).
Recall that one could attain understanding of a variety of different
phenomena, including processes that take place in the external world
events and theories of these processes.9 Let it be agreed that A1, A3
and A2 have the same degree of understanding of the theory of PB
that A3 and A2 have arrived at. (By the lights of KU, this will be the
case if they approximate fully comprehensive and maximally well-
connected knowledge of what the theory says equally closely.) In-
stead, let’s focus on PB itself, a phenomenon of the mind-independent
world we inhabit. I take it that, intuitively, (i) A1 has a better (because
maximal rather than non-maximal) understanding of PB than A2 and
(ii) A1 and A2 both have a better (because well researched rather than
confabulated) understanding that A3.
The crucial intuitive claim (ii) finds further theoretical support
from the following argument: understanding affords the agent cog-
nitive access to its object, that is, in the case of PB, a phenomenon
of mind-independent reality. At the same time, A3’s beliefs are the
products of confabulations, stories with no grounding in, no connec-
tion to mind-independent reality whatsoever. Since access requires
connection, these confabulations cannot afford A3 much in the way
of cognitive access at all.10 More importantly, however, they do not
afford A3 the same degree of cognitive access to PB as A1 and A2
whose careful research into the phenomenon establishes just such a
connection, thereby giving us (ii).
9 Greco flags the importance of this distinction in a recent paper (2014).
10 Unsurprisingly, I also find it plausible that A3 does not have much in the way
of understanding of PB at all and that A2’s understanding of PB is much better than
A3’s. However, U-Bet is, of course, not suited to predict this. In the absence of a
more encompassing account of degrees of understanding, KU will not be able to
explain this intuition.
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Where ’U(_ , . . . )’ denotes _’s the degree of understanding of . . . ,
there is thus reason to believe that the correct order of comparative
degrees of understanding for Case 1 – Case 3 is this:
U(A1, PB) > U(A2, PB) > U(A3, PB) [1]
However, Kvanvig’s account does not deliver this result. Recall that,
by Kvanvig’s lights, degree of understanding is a function of coher-
ence and informativeness of beliefs. Since A1’s beliefs about PB are
more informative (and, we may assume, are no less coherent) than
A2’s, Kvanvig can secure the intuitive result that A1’s understand-
ing is better than A2. However, since A2 and A3 have exactly the
same beliefs about PB, they are equally informative and coherent. In
consequence, his account predicts the following order of degrees of
understanding:
U(A1, PB) > U(A2, PB) = U(A3, PB) [2]
In contrast with Kvanvig’s account, KU delivers the correct re-
sults. Since A1 and A2’s beliefs about PB all qualify as knowledge,
we get that β(A1, PB) = κ(A1, PB) and β(A2, PB) = κ(A2, PB). Since,
as already saw, β(A2, PB) ⊂ β(A1, PB), it follows that κ(A2, PB) ⊂
κ(A1, PB). In addition, since A1’s fully comprehensive knowledge
of PB is also maximally well-connected, the grounding relations that
hold between the members of A2’s knowledge about PB is a subset of
the ones that hold between the members of A1’s knowledge about PB,
i.e. γ(A2, PB) ⊆ γ(A1, PB). In this way, we get β(A2, PB) ⊆ β(A1, PB),
γ(A2, PB) ⊆ γ(A1, PB) and κ(A2, PB) ⊂ κ(A1, PB). By U-Bet, it fol-
lows that A1’s understanding of PB is better than A2’s.
What about A2 and A3? We already have β(A2, PB) = κ(A2, PB)
and β(A2, PB) = β(A3, PB). Since a subset of β(A3, PB) is arrived
at via confabulation and so falls short of knowledge, κ(A3, PB) ⊂
β(A3, PB). This gives us κ(A3, PB) ⊂ κ(A2, PB). In addition, since A2’s
knowledge about PB is as well-connected as it can be, the grounding
relations that hold between the members of A3’s knowledge about
PB is a subset of the ones that hold between the members of A2’s
knowledge about PB, i.e. γ(A3, PB) ⊆ γ(A2, PB). In this way, we
get β(A3, PB) ⊆ β(A2, PB), γ(A3, PB) ⊆ γ(A2, PB) and κ(A3, PB) ⊂
κ(A3, PB). By U-Bet, it follows that A2’s understanding of PB is better
than A3’s. KU makes the correct predictions in Case 1 – Case 3, to
wit, [1]. In this way these cases constitute evidence favouring KU
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over Kvanvig’s account.11
3.2 Elgin
Elgin’s account of understanding is even weaker than Kvanvig’s in
that Elgin drops the factivity condition on understanding. Elgin pro-
vides a rough characterisation of her view in the following passage:
As a very crude first approximation, I suggest that understand-
ing is a grasp of a comprehensive general body of information
that is grounded in fact, is duly responsive to evidence, and
enables non-trivial inference, argument, and perhaps action re-
garding that subject the information pertains to.
(Elgin 2009, 327)
As Elgin herself aptly notes, her characterisation is “hideously rough”.
For present purposes, what I would like to focus on is Elgin’s ground-
edness condition on understanding according to which understand-
ing must be grounded in fact. What could she mean by “ground-
edness” here? The candidates that first spring to mind—causal and
modal accounts—won’t do the job because they are bound to render
understanding of a priori necessary phenomena problematic. Fortu-
nately, Elgin doesn’t seem to have any such account in mind. While
Elgin doesn’t provide a detailed account of groundedness in this pa-
per, her earlier book fills the gap. The account offered there is fit-
tingly internalist: grounding of understanding is explained in terms
11 Suppose my claim in fn.10 is correct in that A3 does not have much under-
standing about PB at all and that A2’s understanding of PB is much better than
A3’s. Then there is further trouble on the horizon for Kvanvig. To see this consider
another agent, A′3 who via confabulation arrives at a set β(A′3, PB) about PB such
that β(A′3, PB) = β(A1, PB). In that case, it would seem that the intuitively correct
order of degrees of understanding is as follows:
U(A1, PB) > U(A2, PB) > U(A′3, PB) ≥ U(A3, PB) [3]
However, Kvanvig’s account would seem to predict the following:
U(A1, PB) = U(A′3, PB) > U(A2, PB) = U(A3, PB) [4]
In particular, the prediction that A′3’s confabulated understanding is better than
A2’s well-researched understanding seems highly problematic. In contrast, KU
seems to be compatible with the correct ordering. After all, it seems that well-
researched understanding will plausibly involve more knowledge than confabu-
lated understanding. However, in the absence of a more developed account of
degrees of understanding and a more detailed account of what agents like A3 and
A′3 may actually still know about the relevant phenomena, KU does not make any
determinate predictions on this case.
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of accommodation of prior beliefs. More specifically, the basic picture
Elgin (1996, ch. 4) has in mind is this: We start with a set of beliefs
(or “commitments” as Elgin calls them). These beliefs enjoy prima
facie justification (in Elgin’s terms they are “initially tenable”), but
may be in tension with each other or may not explain everything we
want explained. In order to resolve the tension/meet our explanatory
needs we construct theories, thereby arriving at a new set of beliefs
the justification of which is a function of two factors, viz. (a) inter-
nal coherence and (b) accommodation of prior beliefs. Even a set of
beliefs that enjoys all things considered justification (in Elgin’s terms
a “system in reflective equilibrium”) at a certain time might have to
be revised at some future time, for instance because our explanatory
needs change due to new discoveries. When this happens we return
to theory construction and so on.
The key to Elgin’s account of grounding can be found in the fol-
lowing passage:
No mere castles in the air, systems in reflective equilibrium are
tethered—not to Things in Themselves but to our antecedent
understanding of and interest in the matter at hand. Coherence
provides justification in the system; the tie to initially tenable
commitments, justification of the system.
(Elgin 1996, 107)
Here Elgin is very clear that what grounds the relevant sets of beliefs
(what “tethers” them, what prevents them from being “mere castles
in the air”) is the fact that they accommodate our prior beliefs (“the
tie to initially tenable commitments”).
Notice furthermore that Elgin can make sense of degrees of un-
derstanding in a way similar to Kvanvig, by maintaining that degree
of understanding is a function of coherence and informativeness of
one’s set of beliefs and the degree to which it accommodates prior
beliefs.12
Unsurprisingly, Elgin’s account faces similar problems as Kvan-
vig’s. Thus consider the following cases:
Case 4. A4, a famous political scientist, has conducted careful research into
a certain recent political phenomenon, PP, thus arriving at a set of
beliefs β(A4, PP) of beliefs about PP. Let us suppose that all members
of β(A4, PP) qualify as knowledge and that, in fact, A4 has attained
fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of PP.
12 Again, we might have to add significance to the mix here. Again, for present
purposes, these complications are of little consequence.
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Case 5. A5, another political scientist and contemporary of A4’s, has con-
ducted careful research into PP. A5 has gathered and come to believe
a set of data, δ5, about PP. Moreover, A5 has devised and come to
believe a theory T5 of PP. In this way, A5 arrives at a set β(A5, PP) of
beliefs about PP, including the belief that T5 is plausible in light of δ5,
that T5 explains δ5, that β(A5, PP) is highly coherent and that T5 ac-
commodates A5’s prior beliefs. Suppose that A5’s beliefs are a proper
subset of A4’s beliefs, i.e. β(A5, PP) ⊂ β(A4, PP), that all members of
β(A5, PP) qualify as knowledge and that A5’s knowledge of PP is as
well-connected as it can be.
Case 6. A6 is a lone brain in a vat that is hosting deceptive experiences as
of a physical world involving other agents. Now suppose that A6 is
mental duplicate of A5 in the sense that throughout their personal
histories A5 and A6 have had exactly the same experiences, beliefs
etc.13
Intuitively, A4’s understanding here is (i) better than A5’s (because
maximal rather than non-maximal) and (ii) A4 and A5’s understand-
ing is better than A6’s. Again, claim (ii) can be backed by argument.
In Case 6, there are no other human beings and hence no political
phenomena. In particular PP doesn’t even occur. As a result, A6’s
inquiries, however well intentioned and virtuously carried out, can-
not grant her cognitive access to PP either. More importantly, her
inquiries don’t afford her the same degree of cognitive access as A4
and A5, whose inquiries establish a connection with and thereby af-
ford them cognitive access to PP, which gives us (ii).
There is thus reason to believe that the correct order of degree of
understanding is:
U(A4, PP) > U(A5, PP) > U(A6, PP) [5]
Recall that, by Elgin’s lights, degree of understanding is a function
of coherence and informativeness of beliefs as well as the degree to
which it accommodates prior beliefs. Since A4’s beliefs about PP are
more informative (and, we may assume, are no less coherent and
13 If anti-individualism (Putnam 1975; Burge 1979) is true, the story will have to
be slightly more complicated. We will have to suppose that A6 led a normal life up
until the contents of her relevant mental states were fixed and was then abducted
and envatted. We will also have to suppose that A6 acquires the beliefs about PP
after her envatment and before the contents of her mental states change. However,
there is no obstacle in principle to this. Moreover, given Elgin’s internalist inclina-
tions, it would be surprising, to say the least, if she were an anti-individualist.
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accommodating of prior beliefs) than A5’s, Elgin can secure the intu-
itive result that A4’s understanding is better than A5. However, since
A5 and A6 are mental duplicates, their beliefs score equally high on
all of these counts. In consequence, Elgin’s account predicts the fol-
lowing order of degrees of understanding:
U(A4, PP) > U(A5, PP) = U(A6, PP) [6]
Since Elgin’s account passes the wrong verdicts here, the cases con-
stitute evidence against her account.
In contrast with Elgin’s account, KU delivers the correct results.
Since A4 and A5’s beliefs about PP all qualify as knowledge, we
get that β(A4, PP) = κ(A4, PP) and β(A5, PP) = κ(A5, PP). Since,
as already saw, β(A5, PP) ⊂ β(A4, PP), it follows that κ(A5, PP) ⊂
κ(A4, PP). In addition, since A4’s fully comprehensive knowledge
of PP is also maximally well-connected, the grounding relations that
hold between the members of A5’s knowledge about PP is a subset of
the ones that hold between the members of A4’s knowledge about PP,
i.e. γ(A5, PP) ⊆ γ(A4, PP). In this way, we get β(A5, PP) ⊆ β(A4, PP),
γ(A5, PP) ⊆ γ(A4, PP) and κ(A5, PP) ⊂ κ(A4, PP). By U-Bet, it fol-
lows that A4’s understanding of PP is better than A5’s.
What about A5 and A6? We already have β(A5, PP) = κ(A5, PP)
and β(A5, PP) = β(A6, PP). Since A6 is a radically deceived brain in
a vat, a subset of her beliefs falls short of knowledge, i.e. κ(A6, PP) ⊂
β(A6, PP). This gives us κ(A6, PP) ⊂ κ(A5, PP). In addition, since A5’s
knowledge about PP is as well-connected as it can be, the grounding
relations that hold between the members of A6’s knowledge about
PP is a subset of the ones that hold between the members of A5’s
knowledge about PP, i.e. γ(A6, PP) ⊆ γ(A5, PP). In this way, we
get β(A6, PP) ⊆ β(A5, PP), γ(A6, PP) ⊆ γ(A5, PP) and κ(A6, PP) ⊂
κ(A5, PP). By U-Bet, it follows that A5’s understanding of PP is better
than A6’s. KU makes the correct predictions in Case 1 – Case 3, to
wit, [5]. In this way these cases constitute evidence favouring KU
over Elgin’s account as well.14
14 Again, in much the same way as in the case of Kvanvig before (see fn.11),
further trouble arises from a case involving an agent, A′6, who, like A6, is a lone
brain in a vat but is a mental duplicate of A1. The intuitive order of understanding
is the following:
U(A4, PP) > U(A5, PP) > U(A′6, PP) ≥ U(A6, PP) [7]
13
4 Objections
KU carries some promise in that it at least seems to fare better than its
most prominent non-knowledge based competitors in the literature.
Nonetheless, opponents of K accounts have adduced a number of
objections to this kind of view. In this section, I will sketch the most
prominent such objections in the literature and show how they can
be dealt with by KU.
4.1 Gettiered Understanding
The first objection against K accounts of understanding is due to
Kvanvig (2003) who argues that understanding but not knowledge
is compatible with (a certain form of) gettierisation. To bring this
point home, Kvanvig invites us to consider the following case:
Consider, say, someone’s historical understanding of the Co-
manche dominance of the southern plains of North America
[henceforth also ‘COMANCHE’] from the late seventeenth un-
til the late nineteenth centuries. Suppose that if you asked this
person any question about this matter, she would answer cor-
rectly. Assume further that the person is answering from stored
information; she is not guessing or making up answers, but is
honestly averring what she confidently believes the truth to be.
Such an ability is surely constitutive of understanding, and the
experience of query and answer, if sustained for a long enough
period of time, would generate convincing evidence that the
person in question understood the phenomenon of Comanche
dominance of the southern plains.”
(Kvanvig 2003, 197-8)
Crucially, Kvanvig points out that while the history aficionado’s be-
liefs will normally also qualify as knowledge, they need not. The
case can be set up as a Gettier case and so the history aficionado’s
However, Elgin’s account would seem to predict the following:
U(A4, PP) = U(A′6, PP) > U(A5, PP) = U(A6, PP) [8]
Again, the prediction that the understanding of a brain in a vat, A′6 is better than
A5’s well-researched understanding seems highly problematic. Again, whilst com-
patible with the correct ordering, in the absence of a more developed account of
degrees of understanding and a more detailed account of what agents like A6 and
A′6 may actually still know about the relevant phenomena, KU does not make any
determinate predictions on this case.
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beliefs are only luckily true. Here’s how Kvanvig ventures to achieve
this:
For example, most history books might have been mistaken,
with only the correct ones being the sources of the understand-
ing in question and with no basis in the subject for preferring
the sources consulted over those ignored.
(Kvanvig 2003, 198)
The thought here is that the case is relevantly analogous to the noto-
rious Ginet/Goldman fake barn case (see Goldman 1976), in which
the agent acquires a true belief that he is facing a barn whilst driving
alongside a field that otherwise contains only cleverly constructed
fakes. For that reason, the history aficionado understands COMANCHE
even though the beliefs that constitute his understanding are get-
tiered and hence do not qualify as knowledge.
One problem I have with this case is that it is actually not clear
that the fake barn case is the correct model for it. After all, in the
fake barn case, the agent (i) comes to truly believe one proposition, to
wit, that he is looking at a barn. Moreover, (ii) he might easily have
believed the same proposition, but (iii) that belief would have been false.
In contrast, in the Comanche case, the history aficionado (i) acquires
a body of interconnected true beliefs about COMANCHE. What might
easily have happened is (ii) that he might have come by a different body
of interconnected beliefs. Finally, (iii) while some members of the body
of interconnected beliefs the history aficionado might have arrived
at, including some central ones, would have been false, it is far from
clear that all of them would have been false (or even unknown).
Here is a more adequate model for the Comanche case: Someone
selects a particular school for his daughter on the ground that it is
housed in a nicer building than all the other schools in the neighbour-
hood. Suppose, furthermore, the school selected happens to be the
only school in the neighbourhood that teaches evolutionary theory
instead of creationism. Note that this case parallels the Comanche
case closely, much more closely than the fake barns case. After all,
just as in the Comanche case, in this case, (i) the daughter acquires
a body of interconnected true beliefs about a certain phenomenon, here
the origin of species. What’s more, (ii) she might easily have come by
a different body of interconnected beliefs about it, that is, if she had been
sent to a different school. Finally, (iii) while some members of the
body of interconnected beliefs, including central ones, would have
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been false, it is far from clear that all of them would have been false
(or even unknown).
It comes to light that the Comanche case parallels the school case
much more closely than the fake barns case. Now, the crucial ques-
tion is whether, in the school case, the daughter’s beliefs about the
origin of species qualify as knowledge. In my view, the answer here
is yes. Surely, the daughter can come to know things she learns at
school about the origin of species, even if different schools she might
easily have attended instead would have taught her falsehoods. If so,
Kvanvig has failed to make a compelling case that, in the Comanche
case, the beliefs about COMANCHE the history aficionado arrives at
fall short of knowledge. On the contrary, if anything, there is reason
to think, pace Kvanvig, that the history aficionado’s beliefs about CO-
MANCHE do qualify as knowledge, even if different books he might
easily have read instead would have led him to believe falsehoods.
As a result, Kvanvig’s case fails to make a compelling case against
knowledge based accounts of understanding.
That said, it may be worth noting that KU has the resources to pro-
vide yet another account of the Comanche case, one that can concede
that many of the history aficionado’s beliefs in the Comanche case
fall short of knowledge. Recall that, according to U-Out, attributions
of understanding are given a contextualist semantics. Roughly, one
understands a phenomenon just in case one knows enough about it to
satisfy a contextually determined standard. Notice next that even if,
in the Comanche case, some of the history aficionado’s beliefs about
COMANCHE are gettiered, others may qualify as knowledge, includ-
ing (i) what the relevant theory about COMANCHE says and (ii) that
it is a highly plausible theory. Now, this knowledge might be enough
in the sense required by U-Out if the contextually determined stan-
dards are sufficiently low. Consider, for instance, a context in which
all we are looking for is someone who will correctly answer a number
of questions about COMANCHE. In such a context, it would seem
that someone who, like the history aficionado, knows what the cor-
rect theory about COMANCHE says and knows it to be highly plau-
sible, will know enough to meet our needs.15 Given that this is so,
it is also plausible that the standards operative in this context should
15 We might have to add that this person is not aware of any alternative theories
that she believes to be equally or almost equally plausible. Otherwise she might not
be prepared to answer in accordance with what the theory says. Notice, however,
that the history aficionado also satisfies this additional requirement.
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be low enough to allow us to truly attribute this agent understanding
of the phenomenon. But now notice that the context just described
fits the context that Kvanvig sets up like a glove. After all, what
Kvanvig takes to be the crucial evidence that the history aficionado
understands COMANCHE is that the history aficionado such that “if
you asked [her] any question about this matter, she would answer
correctly” (Kvanvig 2003, 197). In consequence, KU may be able to
secure the result that, in the relevant context, the history aficionado
can truly be attributed understanding of COMANCHE even if many
of his beliefs about the issue are gettiered.
4.2 Models, Idealisations and Thought Experiments in Science
A second set of objections to K accounts venture to show that, as
opposed to knowledge, understanding is not factive. That is to say,
one can come to understand something even though some of the
beliefs that constitute one’s understanding are false. Elgin presents
a number of arguments along these lines one of which concerns the
role of idealisation, models and thought experiments in science. She
considers a variety of examples including the ideal gas law:
The ideal gas law, for example, accounts for the behaviour of
gases by characterizing the behaviour of a gas composed of di-
mensionless, spherical molecules that are not subject to friction
and exhibit no intermolecular attraction. There is no such gas.
Indeed, there could be no such gas. Nonetheless, scientists pur-
port to understand the behaviour of actual gases by reference
to the ideal gas law.
(Elgin 2009, 326)
As the case of the ideal gas law illustrates, idealisations, simplified
models and thought experiments play a central role in scientific the-
orising and constitute a crucial part of our understanding of the sub-
ject matter. Our understanding of the behaviour of gases rests cru-
cially on the ideal gas law. At the same time, these idealisations,
models and thought experiments do not describe any part of the nat-
ural world and so are not literally true. The ideal gas law is a case
in point: the natural world features no gases with the properties the
ideal gas law assumes gases to have. It is therefore not literally true.
It goes without saying that if idealisations, models and thought
experiments are not literally true, then no one can know them to be
literally true. At the same time, it is simply not part of KU that a
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proposition or theory can contribute to our understanding of vari-
ous scientific phenomena only if it is known to be literally true. In-
stead, by the lights of KU, it will so contribute if it allows us to make
progress in the direction of fully comprehensive and maximally well-
connected knowledge of the phenomena. And there is excellent rea-
son to think that idealisations, models and thought experiments do
this much for us. After all, we can still know what (theories includ-
ing) these idealisations, models and thought experiments say. For
instance, we can know what a theory including the ideal gas law
says. We can also know that actual scientific entities approximate the
idealisations, etc. in various respects and to various degrees. For in-
stance, we can know that actual gases approximate ‘ideal gases’ in
various respects. Finally, we can know the limitations of idealisa-
tions, etc. Since this knowledge advances us in the direction of fully
comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of the rel-
evant phenomena—in the case of the ideal gas law of the physics
of gases—by KU, it constitutes part of our understanding of them.
It thus comes to light that while the fact that idealisations, etc. are
not true of any actual scientific entities may mean that they cannot
be part of our understanding of the relevant scientific phenomena
in the most straightforward way, it does not follow that they cannot
constitute part of our relevant understanding at all.
4.3 Scientific Progress
Another argument against K accounts, also due to Elgin (2009, 325-
6), proceeds along the following lines: Scientific understanding pro-
gresses from the crude to the sophisticated. For instance, the first
seed of a great evolutionary biologist’s understanding of the evolu-
tion of humankind may consist in a belief that human beings evolved
from apes. Throughout his education his beliefs about the evolution
of humankind became refined. The crude belief was replaced by a
belief that humans and apes had a common hominid ancestor. It
also became embedded in a web of beliefs about evolution that make
him the expert he is now. On a social level, our contemporary un-
derstanding of astronomy developed from Ptolemy’s theory of the
movement of the planets, via Kepler, Newton and relativity theory to
string theory.
Elgin claims that developments like these may manifest and often
do manifest genuine cognitive progress, genuine progress in under-
standing. Throughout the various stages of the development, our
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understanding of the subject matter—e.g. of the origin of species or
astronomy—is embodied by the theory of the subject matter we ac-
cept at that stage. Crucially, however, not only the crude beginnings
of scientific theorising on a subject matter, but also even the best the-
ories science has produced thus far are all false. In consequence, on
any account on which understanding is factive, the sophisticated are
on par with the unsophisticated: neither has achieved understanding.
It is not hard to see that Elgin’s objection will work only on the
assumption that, according to K accounts, there can be progress in
scientific understanding of a phenomenon as we move from one the-
ory to another only if at least the successor theory is (known to be)
true. Again, however, KU is simply not committed to this assump-
tion. By KU, progress in scientific understanding of a phenomenon
will occur if we make progress towards fully comprehensive and
maximally well-connected knowledge of the phenomenon in ques-
tion. Moving from one false theory to another may do the trick. In
fact, Elgin’s own case of moving to a theory including the ideal gas
law plausibly constitutes a case in point here. Even if we grant that,
just like its predecessor, this theory is false, it may nonetheless serve
to increase our knowledge about the physics of gases, as we have just
seen. Again, just because the contribution to progress is not made in
the most straightforward way, it does not follow that no contribution
to progress is made at all.16
4.4 Understanding via Incompatible Theories
The last objection I will discuss within the scope of this paper is due
to Zagzebski who argues that incompatible theories can give their
champions understanding of some phenomena. Here is Zagzebski:
More than one alternative theory may give understanding of
the same subject matter. This makes sense if we think of a the-
ory as a representation of reality, where alternative representa-
tions can be better or worse, more or less accurate. But more
than one may be equally good, equally accurate. This form of
understanding does not presuppose knowledge or even true be-
lief, and if we assume that two competing representations of the
same part of reality cannot both constitute knowledge, it cannot
16 It may be worth noting that, in a recent paper, Alexander Bird (2007) forcefully
argues that scientific progress must be understood in terms of accumulation of
knowledge. If successful, Bird’s argument turns the tables on those who think that
K accounts have difficulties in explaining progress in science.
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be a form of knowledge.
(Zagzebski 2001, 244)
Just as Elgin before, Zagzebski presupposes that, according to K
accounts, champions of a theory can attain understanding of the un-
derlying phenomenon only if they know the theory to be true. As I
have already pointed out, KU is not committed to this kind of claim.
In fact, is not hard to see that KU can allow that more than one al-
ternative theory can deliver an equal degree of understanding. After
all, it is possible for adherents of two (or more) distinct theories to be
equidistant from fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected
knowledge of a certain phenomenon.17 In that case, KU predicts that
they have the same degree of understanding of the phenomenon.
5 Conclusion
There is thus reason to believe that KU has an edge over its most
prominent non-knowledge based competitors. KU passes the correct
verdict in Case 1 – Case 6 with at least a subset of which each of
its most prominent non-knowledge based competitors struggle. At
the same time, by disavowing the claim that, in order to have some
positive degree of understanding of a certain phenomenon, all of
one’s beliefs about it must qualify as knowledge or that one must
know that one’s theory of the phenomenon is true, KU can avoid
at least some of the most prominent problems for K accounts in the
literature.
Of course, the arguments presented here do not show that KU is
the only viable account of understanding. After all, I have not argued
that there aren’t any non-knowledge based accounts other than the
one’s discussed in §3 that avoid the problems raised there. And I also
haven’t shown that there aren’t any other K accounts that avoid the
problems discussed in §4.
However, I believe that, whether or not the arguments presented
ultimately serve to establish the truth of KU, the paper gets at least
a number of fundamental things right. Perhaps most importantly, it
extends the range of relevant data by considering comparative de-
grees of understanding across cases rather than focusing exclusively
on outright understanding in a single case. I think this is a step in
17 Furthermore, two agents may be equidistant from fully comprehensive and
maximally well-connected knowledge of a phenomenon because they are approxi-
mating such knowledge via different routes (e.g. breadth vs. depth).
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the right direction because because in so many cases judgements of
comparative degree are less complex and thus may be expected to
be easier to get right than outright judgements.18 This suggests that
it surely can’t hurt to consider comparative degrees of understand-
ing across cases. Indeed, it provides some reason to accord intu-
itive judgements about comparative degrees of understanding more
weight than intuitive judgements of outright understanding.
Considering comparative degrees of understanding also delivers
one main insight, viz. that, pace Kvanvig, etiology of belief matters to
degree of understanding. As cases (Case 1) – (Case 6) suggest, the
quality of one’s understanding varies with how the relevant beliefs
are acquired: for instance, careful research yields better understand-
ing than confabulations. Whether or not KU is true, this is good
news for K accounts. After all, it is just what one would expect if
understanding affords an analysis in terms of knowledge.
Finally, I would like to briefly mention another line that I think is
promising for defenders of K accounts. As I have argued elsewhere
(Author 2014b,c), again pace Kvanvig, knowledge is the aim of in-
quiry into particular propositions. And suppose furthermore, as has
been argued by a number of philosophers of science19, that under-
standing is the aim of scientific inquiry. Then further support for K
accounts will flow from the fact that only K accounts will be able
to provide a unified account of the aims of scientific inquiry and of
inquiry into particular propositions. If successful, the argument will
provide powerful support for K accounts because it will provide a
solid theoretical reason for accepting some such account. I am op-
timistic about the prospects of this argument. However, in view of
limitations of space, I will leave a detailed investigation of this line
for another occasion.
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